This paper uses management control, resource-based and systems-based strategy theories to describe a large U.S. manufacturing company's efforts to improve profitability by designing and using a performance measurement model (PMM). This PMM includes multiple performance measures relevant to its distribution channel for products, repair parts and maintenance services. The PMM is intended to reflect the company's understanding of performance relations among strategic resources, operational capabilities, and desired financial outcomes. The PMM also reflects its intended distribution strategy, the types of performance necessary to achieve that strategy by its distributors, and its desired financial outcomes. Furthermore, the company uses the model to evaluate its North American distributors and intends to use these evaluations as a partial basis for annual and long-term rewards. Thus, the PMM embodies the measurable portion of the firm's management control system of its distribution channel.
4 outcomes, they do not qualify as systems models; that is, they do not model the determinants of financial performance even within the boundaries of the firm.
More comprehensive PMM include Otley's [1999] performance management model, Ittner and Larcker's [2001] value-based management model, Epstein et al.'s [2000] APL model, Kanji's business scorecard [Kanji and Moura e Sa, [2002] and the balanced scorecard (BSC) Norton, 1996, 2001 ]. These models describe links among business decisions and outcomes, and serve to guide strategy development, communication, implementation, and feedback at multiple points along the value chain. Because these comprehensive PMM are business models, refle cting inputs and both intermediate and final outputs, they generally include measures of operational, strategic, financial and non-financial performance. These models do represent efforts to use organizational knowledge to model the firm as a system and implement management control. This study investigates whether management control, knowledge-based and systems-based theories of the firm are descriptive in a particular case. Although a study such as this cannot generalize to the population of firms using PMM, the findings of this study can illustrate the theories applied to this investigation [Yin, 1994] and can provide a foundation for theory improvement, replications , and large sample tests.
This study addresses two research questions:
• Which criteria does a firm use to choose initial PMM weights and measures?
• Why does a firm change PMM weights and measures?
The questions are investigated both qualitatively and quantitatively using (1) archival documents that describe the company's distribution PMM and (2) interviews with top managers and distributors to understand the nature of the business and the objectives and dynamic structure of the PMM.
Finally, the paper reflects on the implications of this study for performance measurement and management control. Principal findings are that measures were chosen consistently with emerging theory but some changes to the PMM were inconsistent with theory. Subsequent sections of this paper address theories supporting predicted answers to the research questions, the research site, analysis of qualitative data, discussion of results, and conclusions.
Management Control Theory, Knowledge -Based and Systems -Based Theories and PMM
Management control theory argues that management control systems (MCS), which include PMM, are intended to insure that employees (1) know what is expected of them, (2) will exert effort to do what is expected, (3) are capable of doing what is expected, and (4) accomplish what is expected [e.g., Merchant, 1998 ]. For more than 30 years, researchers have known that firms choose a portfolio of controls and performance measures [e.g., Khandwalla, 1972] . However, subsequent research on 5 firms' choices of performance measures often has focused on broad dichotomies of measures, such as financial vs. non-financial measures and mechanistic vs. organic controls. The theory commonly used in that research likewise characterizes the contingencies affecting choices of measures and controls as broad dichotomies (e.g., high vs. low environmental uncertainty; old vs. new technology).
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One particularly popular research stream predicts that firms operating in complex and risky environments rely heavily on qualitative controls and non-financial performance measures and to a much lesser degree (if at all) on quantitative, financial-performance measures. Contingency research on choice of performance measures has yielded mixed results, perhaps because most of the reported studies are based on cross-sectional survey data, which can obscure the idiosyncrasies of firm-level definitions and implementations of performance measurements [e.g., Anderson and Young, 1999; Chenhall, 2003; Luft and Shields, 2002b] . Enough evidence exists, however, to suggest that most firms rely to some degree on financial performance measures and many use both quantitative and qualitative controls. In other words, firms evidently have great flexibility to choose the portfolio of measures and controls (especially when characterized as broad dichotomies) that they expect to work best in their situations. This equivocal result provides some motivation to search for additional theoretical explanation for the choice of performance measures. 
Strategy and PMM
Theories that explain management policies based on strategic resources, capabilities, learning, and systems offer guidance and predictions for the choice of performance measures. Recent strategic management literature has evolved the concept of a firm's product strategy beyond Porter's [1985] depiction of managing the value chain to achieve competitive advantage (e.g., through product cost leadership or differentiation). Porter's work on the importance of strategic positioning has greatly influenced later work that seeks to explain how firms might use their resources to attain strategic positioning. Research that followed Porter explains how firms reach and maintain the positions of strategic advantage that he described.
Barney [1991] argues that successful firms achieve competitive advantage by acquir ing and us ing unique resources to build inimitable capabilities that create strategic advantages [see also Amit and Schoemaker, 1993 and Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001] . Organizational learning theory by Nonaka and Takeuchi [1995] and Senge [1990] predicts that successful firms create strategic advantages by learning dynamically to use their resources effectively. This learning is realized through development and deployment of the firm's capabilities, processes, or competencies to use resources [e.g., Prahalad and Hamel, 1990] . Morecroft et al. [2002] hypothesize that successful firms manage strategic resources and capabilities through holistic management systems; that is, creating and maintaining strategic advantages are enhanced by systemic management. Our accounting interpretation of current 6 management theories is that firms create and maintain strategic advantages or positions by efficiently creating, deploying, and using performance-based management control systems. Furthermore, the measurable part of the management control system should itself be systemic, in the form of a PMM.
Management Control and PMM
Recent management control research addresses specific factors that might explain firms' choices of performance measures to achieve and maintain strategic advantages. Laboratory experiments [e.g., Libby et al, 2002; Lipe and Salterio, 2000; Shields, 2001, 2002a] and surveys of management control practice [e.g., Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2002; Ittner and Larcker, 1998 ] have identified attributes of performance measures that are associated with use, usefulness, and performance. When combined with current resource-based and systems-based strategy theories, what emerges is a focus on performance measures' attributes that supercede the popular financial vs. nonfinancial dichotomy. In all cases the literature cited in the following subsections presumes that the organization seeks to improve performance relative to its strategic goals. Implications of these complementary management theories for choices of PMM are considered as follows.
Measures are diverse and complementary. Firms' management controls can benefit from greater diversity of performance measures (i.e., operational, strategic, financial, and non-financial measures) if operational measures reflect the current drivers of future financial performance and are early in the value chain . Milgrom & Roberts [1995] argue that, if a diverse set of performance measures is a complete and complementary set (or system), using a subset of measures leads to inferior performance. From a similar systems perspective, Warren [2002] argues that successful management policies (e.g., PMM) reflect resource interdependence, complementarity, and temporal causality between resources and outcomes of uses (discussed in more detail later).
Measures are objective and accurate. Ijiri [1967] long ago re-established the theoretical importance of (accounting) performance measure accuracy and objectivity. This topic has not lost relevance.
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More recently, Libby et al. [2002] find that experimental subjects in management-control tasks rely on performance measures that have been verified by third parties, which might create demand for accurate and objective measures. Other studies have found that low-quality measurement is associated with low management control system use or impact [Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2002; Ittner and Larcker, 1998 ]. However, it is unclear ex ante if investing in measurements is superior to measuring the wrong things or the right things poorly, or avoiding unreliable measures altogether [e.g., Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2002; Gates, 1999] . Objectivity (or verifiability) and accuracy (or error free) are theoretically independent concepts yet are often coincident in practice with reference to performance measurement. Antle and Demski, 1988] . In particular, early value-chain measures can be valuable if they are informative about managers' leading actions [Ittner and Larcker, 2001] in sufficient time to take corrective control actions.
Measures are informative
Measures communicate strategy. Models such as PMM facilitate communication, learning, and creation of new knowledge and can be the key tool to building a learning organization [Huff and Jenkins, 2003 ]. The right performance measures align actions and strategy by reducing managers' financial myopia [McKenzie and Schilling, 1998 ], and effectively communicate strategy [Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Malina and Selto, 2001] . Systemic management understands and exploits knowledge of dynamic interrelations among resources and capabilities. The elements of a PMM are intended to reflect the strategic use of resources and deployment of efficient processes [e.g., Sanchez et al., 2002] .
Measures create incentives for improvement. Using performance measures that capture inherent time delays between certain decisions (e.g., investing in R&D and employee development) can lead to improved incentives [e.g., Rappaport, 1999; Cloutier and Boehlje, 2002] . Ittner and Larcker [2001] also observe that operational measures, which have good "line of sight," can increase the expectancy of rewards based on those measures [e.g., Green, 1992] .
Measures improve decision-making .Organization of measures into distinct categories can affect decision making, perhaps by reflecting the structure of knowledge about the firm's value chain [Lipe and Salterio, 2000] . Measures with tangible connections to processes being managed also might activate more knowledge and promote better learning and decision making compared to relying on financial measures alone Shields, 2001, 2002a] . Huff and Jenkins [2002] argue that models (e.g., PMM) organize and express the rationale of complex systems, which aid planning and evaluation activities. Furthermore, such models can represent micro-or macro-levels of knowledge of activities, processes, and systems, thus aiding individuals at all levels of the organization. PMM might improve decision making by identifying actions and impacts that heretofore have been hidden by traditional measurement systems [e.g., Huff and Jenkins, 2002] .
Benefits outweigh costs of collection. Monit oring employee behavior through a PMM is a costly activity. Generating, organizing, and reporting performance information consume scarce company resources [Merchant, 1998; Simons, 2000] . As management accounting researchers have known since the early days of the field [e.g., Horngren, 1967] , the perceived benefits of using performance measures should outweigh the associated costs.
Measures reflect system causality. Some academics and consultants have prescribed forms of causal PMM [e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Epstein et al., 2000; Kanji and Moura e Sa, 2002] . Regardless of the sources of business models, causal relations among firms' multiple performance measures often are neither specified nor measured well . Quantifying cause-and-effect 8 relations between actions and outcomes at key points in the value chain could help predict future effects of current actions [e.g., Eccles, 1991] . A functioning causal PMM also might free managers to focus more on strategy and evaluation issues [e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 2001 ] than on information processing. Furthermore, a comprehensive, causal PMM might reduce the cognitive complexity of understanding and using multiple measures of performance [Luft and Shields, 2002a] . Strategy theorists predict significant benefits from building causal models of firms' strategic resources and capabilities. Huff [1990] and Huff and Jenkins [2002] describe these models as knowledge-based, cognitive maps, which can connect and organize dispersed organizational knowledge.
Predicted Attributes of Measures
Organizations choose performance measures that reflect the use of resources and capabilities that are critical to organizational success. The options for performance measures are limitless and perhaps idiosyncratic to firms and industries; the possible contingencies and tradeoffs, therefore, also might be limitless. Nonetheless, the foregoing discussions lead to predictions of the attributes of measures that organizations choose for (or, alternatively, delete from) PMM. This study hypothesizes that an organization constructs PMM based on performance measure attributes. We recognize that organizations make tradeoffs among these attributes, but theory does not support tradeoff predictions at this time. We later provide descriptive evidence about tradeoffs made in this case. Formally, the hypothesis and testable predictions are as follows:
Hypothesis : Organizations choose performance measures based on measure attributes. Similarly, this study predicts that an organization will delete previously chosen PMM measures, which after experience, are perceived to not exhibit these attributes. Because it is possible that a measure can be useful even if it does not exhibit all attributes, this study explores whether an organization trades-off some attributes.
Research Site
The research takes place within a single firm to benefit from close investigation of (1) a performance model developed by the firm, not imposed by the researchers (or external consultants), (2) measures 9 of performance relevant to that firm, not generic measures that might or might not apply to the firm, and (3) access to multiple levels of managers to enrich the understanding of the origins and uses of the PMM. Thus, this study offers some advantages compared to cross-sectional analysis at the firm level, particularly given the difficulty of comparably describing performance measurement in many firms simultaneously [e.g., Luft and Shields, 2002b] .
This study focuses on a PMM developed by a U.S. FORTUNE 500 equipment manufacturer for its distribution channel. 4 The company employs over 25,000 people in its domestic and foreign operations. The company's competition is from similarly large domestic and international firms. The primary bases of competition for these firms are price, quality, customer service, and speed of delivery of both goods and services. The company sells its major equipment assemblies through OEM contracts and independent, exclusive distributors, who also sell repair parts and maintenance services.
The distribution system is the company's primary contact with retail customers. Each distributor operates within an assigned geographic area. The distributors may not compete with each other or sell competitors' products or services. While the distributorships are independent entities, most are owned by individuals with prior company experience.
Historically, the company has managed top-down and strictly by the "bottom-line." Its primary distribution goal was improving its share of the market for its primary products. Profitability at the distributor level was important (particularly to distributors) but less important than primary market share because most of the company's profit derived from sales of its primary products and parts. This narrow performance focus had caused considerable tension between management and some distributors who saw more profitable, regional opportunities in the company's secondary markets.
This tension persisted through early versions of the PMM but was resolved, as will be explained later.
For many years, the company's success was based on the performance and cost of its major products. Because competitors now have similar products, competition for market share has shifted to customer service. In response to increased competition from both domestic and foreign firms, the company revised its strategy to focus attention and resources on improving quality, customer service, and customer satisfaction. A major step in this change was to develop a strategically oriented PMM for its 31 North American distributorships that communicates the new strategy, guides distributors, and provides additional bases for evaluation. This study will refer to the company's distributor performance model as the DPM.
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According to company documents, the purposes of the DPM are to:
• Highlight areas within distributorships that need improvement to enhance customer relations;
• Provide an objective set of criteria, consistent with the company's new strategic initiatives, to guide and measure total distributor performance;
• Use as the sta rting point for the three-year distributor contract renewal process; and
• Use for comparing and ranking distributors and may be used for performance-based compensation.
The DPM was developed internally by company employees, without the aid of external consultants. As was customary in this company, a top-down approach was used. The DPM designers created the initial DPM with selective input from distributor personnel, although the designers had the final say. The DPM was designed to focus on outcomes that the company felt were important for the distributors to accomplish in order to meet company goals, not necessarily distributor goals.
Therefore, the distributor key success factors do not perfectly mirror those of the company.
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Sources of Data
The data for this study come from interviews with DPM designers and administrators and distributors, from company documents and from archival performance data. During the second quarter of 1999, sixteen interviews were conducted: nine distributor-owners and seven DPM designers and administrators. Distributors, designer and administrator views were sought in order to have a 360 degree view of the DPM process. Note that the questions do not directly prompt respondents to discuss the factors that are predicted to determine choices or changes in either measures or weights. The questions were purposefully generic, providing a framework for discussing DPM measures, but not directly asking about choice or change.
Interviewees freely revealed these factors during the interviews. Their unprompted responses were used to support or deny the predictions. Company documents provided archival background for the structure of the DPM and quantitative data for each quarterly DPM from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2001. The interviews were analyzed using qualitative data software (Atlas.ti). Qualitative data software is used to systematically code the qualitative data. A predetermined set of codes was used to identify 11 portions of interviews text referring to a choice or a change in DPM measures according to each of the eight attribute predictions developed from the literature. Although all respondents had multiple, coded comments, the coding procedure gave each respondent only a single code for each intersection of performance measure and attribute. Thus, if one interviewee, for example, offered a paragraph describing the accuracy of a specific measure, this response generated a single set of codes -one code for the measure and one for the attribute. For each coded comment regarding a prediction, an additional code was attached regarding whether the measure was dropped from the DPM or remained on the DPM during the time period tested. 10 This restrictive approach to coding qualitative data is designed to illustrate or test theory. 11 A complete list of codes used in this research is shown in Table   1 . Table 1 Coding Scheme
Data Analysis
Section 4 is divided into two sections. The first section uses qualitative analysis to analyze evidence regarding the initial choice of performance measures and weightings of those measures. The second section uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis to evaluate interview evidence related to the eight attribute predictions regarding changes of performance measures.
Throughout the four years covered by this research, the company made many changes to the DPM. Weightings changed, measures were added, and measures were dropped. The initial DPM, implemented in the first quarter of 1998, and the revised DPM are shown in table 2. Table 3 contains DPM measure definitions. The most obvious change in the revised DPM is a reduction in the number of measures included. The first DPM contained 29 measures while the most recent has 14. Also, all three of the people measures (performance reviews, industry involvement, and training) were dropped from the DPM. Of the fifteen measures dropped from the initial DPM, fourteen were eliminated at the end of 1999. Table 2 Comparison of DPMs Table 3 DPM Measure Definitions
Other obvious changes in the DPM are the weights assigned to measures. In the first DPM, weightings ranged from 1.0 to 27 points. As the company shortened the DPM, remaining measures 12 ultimately were given either a 5-or 10-point weight. Table 3 chronicles the revisions in the weights assigned to the measures dropped from the DPM over the study period. Table 4 Revised Measure Weights
The following subsections discuss evidence from the interviews that indicates support or lack of support for predicted reasons behind the company's initial choices of all measures, weights, and changes to them.
Research Question 1: Choice of Initial Performance Measures and Weights
The measures chosen for the initial DPM reflect the five strategic initiatives of the company. The five initiatives, which were obtained from company documents, are:
1. Demonstrate a comparative advantage in each of our markets worldwide, measured in product performance, economic value to the customer and all aspects of customer support, 2. Achieve an ave rage return on equity of at least x% over economic cycles in order to afford the investment required to sustain a comparative advantage in each market into the future, and afford investment in new business, 3. Grow in order to provide superior total return to our shareholders over time, 4. Demonstrate our commitment to help improve the community in which we operate and be a responsible citizen of society, and 5. Attract, train, challenge and fully utilize people at all levels in order to achieve these objectives.
Choice of measures.
Interviewees made eleven comments regarding how and why the initial measures appeared on the DPM. The most cited reason (5 comments, or almost half of total comments) for including the initial measures was that they are objective and accurate. A company employee stated:
The objective of the DPM is to have an objective, documented, factual measurement system rather than a subjective one.
Several interviewees commented that the initial measures were chosen for strategic communication and causality. Three comments were made that the initial measures were designed to communicate the corporate strategy down to the distributor level. A DPM designer stated:
The measures were chosen to dovetail the core objectives.
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The measures were also chosen with cause and effect relations in mind. Interviewees mentioned three times that initial weights were based on the most important aspects of the company's strategy.
Another factor in determining initial weights was the accuracy and objectivity of the measures (4 comments). DPM designers aimed to create a model with high-quality measures but recognize that some measures are more credible than others. Anticipated high quality measures, such as service cycle time, received high weights. Low quality measures, such as new market shares, received low weights even if they might have been otherwise important.
We have to consider the quality of the data we're getting when doing the weighting. Hardness of the numbers definitely affects the weights.
It appears that the initial weighting of DPM measures was a function of communicating corporate strategy with consideration for perceived quality of the measure.
Research Question 2: Changes in Performance Weights and Measures -Qualitative Analysis
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Changes in weights. Experience with the DPM measures led to more or less satisfaction with the quality of measurements and induced behaviors. The evolution of this satisfaction is reflected in the trajectories of measures' weights. Consider the evolution of the traditional market share measure.
The measure's weight remained at 28 points for four quarters as the company tried to force distributors to focus on the company's primary market. As disputes grew about the exclusion of other market share measures and as the company became more aware of the other market opportunities, the company dropped the weight to 18 points for a three-quarter period, then to 10 points for another five quarters. The company clung to its traditional market share until it became convinced that this measure was creating too many disputes and was actually impeding company growth. Eventually all market share measures were replaced with equally weighted sales growth measures (for reasons described below).
Changes in measures.
The following subsection describes the results of the qualitative analyses of changes in measures summarized in table 5. The code frequencies in column 1 are meant to reassure the reader that the authors did not selectively focus on unrepresentative comments for the analyses that follow. Column 2 shows the number of respondents comprising the frequency of comment and are meant to reassure the reader that one or two interviewees did not dominate the results. Interviewees commented on this prediction most frequently, with 91 comments in total.
The traditional market share measure dominated the original DPM in part because it was highly objective and accurate.
We know every single [product in the traditional market] that gets sold to the tenth of a percentage point.
In contrast, the new market share measures were perceived to be less accurate and less objective.
How we would measure [new] market share is strictly information we would generate ourselves.
Almost every distributor commented on certain measures being inaccurate or subject to manipulation. In general, the distributors felt that the people measures were not well defined or verifiable. Six of the nine distributors mentioned that these measures involved some guessing and that there was no rigorous audit process in place to verify the data reported. Early in the life of the DPM, the distributors manually collected and reported service cycle time, which the company dropped after a few years. Six of the nine distributors commented on the lack of accuracy in reporting this measure.
I'm going to make that number look as good as I can without outright lying or cheating.
DPM administrators also were aware that the measure might not be accurate.
I wouldn't put a lot of stock in either the [service cycle time measures] we got before or the ones on this scorecard.
Nearly every measure dropped from the DPM lacked perceived objectivity and/or accuracy. The exception was the traditional market share measure which was replaced with the almost equally objective sales growth measure. The majority of the comments supported the alternative form of the prediction that measures are not objective and accurate. The ultimate control over distributor behavior has been the three-year contract review, when the company evaluates distributor performance and either renews or terminates the relationship. The DPM in total is intended to provide a constructive and evaluative structure and to be an objective basis for the contract review. Designers stated:
The only incentive is losing the distributorship and [the DPM] is the centerpiece of the contract review.
The stick might be more evident than any carrot, because as one top manager candidly stated,
It [the DPM] helps when it comes time to terminate a distributor. If you've set up goals and a distributor has failed to achieve them, you can get around sales representation and franchise laws for wrongful termination. It's not the primary objective but it's a benefit.
Nearly every comment supports the null form of P5 that measures provide incentives for improvement.
P6: Measures are supportive of improved decisions. The company chose measures for the DPM to reflect the activities and types of financial and non-financial performance believed to be effective to achieve increased company profitability. Most distributors agreed:
The elements and the structure [of the DPM] are outstanding and they have a lot of potential to help us all improve… I grew up working for a CPA and he ingrained in me that, if you can't measure it, you can't improve it.
Several of the measures on the initial DPM that were subsequently eliminated also were perceived to be helpful for decision making. In regard to training, one distributor mentioned: All but three comments supported DPM measures as being helpful in day-to-day managing and decision making, therefore providing support for the null form of the prediction.
P7: Benefits exceed costs. There were concerns with a number of DPM measures because they were perceived to be misleading or unreliable, and the company perceived the costs of resolving disputes about these subjective measures to be greater than the benefits derived. There were seventeen comments that the cost to compile or the time spent resolving disputes outweighed the benefits received from collecting the measure. The performance evaluation and service cycle time measures in particular were seen as consuming too many resources. Ninety percent of the comments coded to P8 support the prediction that the DPM reflects causality among measures. Interestingly, the distributors and company believed the measures deleted from the DPM are causally related to other measures on the DPM. The nature of measures that were dropped is considered next.
Research Question 2: Changes in Performance Weights and Measures -Quantitative Analysis
If theories of performance measurement choice and retention are descriptive, comments from interviewees should tend to reflect favorable perceptions of the attributes of retained measures (the null form of the predictions), whereas comments should reflect unfavorable perceptions of the attributes of dropped measures (the alternate form of the predictions). Table 6 shows several tests of the distributions of codes, by predictions, for measures dropped from the DPM and for those retained on the DPM. Columns record the frequency of comments associated with dropped and kept measures. Rows record the frequency of comments associated with favorable (null) and unfavorable (alternate) perceptions. Chi-square tests compared the observed distribution of comments to the expected distribution, which assumes that dropping or keeping a measure is unrelated to null or alternate predictions. Table 6 Analysis of Attribute Codes and Measure
Retention
The chi-square test of the overall hypothesis that measures are kept or dropped because of the eight attributes indicates that the pattern is not random, but is significantly different (p < 0.005) from the predicted distribution, conservatively generated from actual frequencies. This result indicates that measures' attributes are important considerations for dropping or keeping DPM measures. Retained measures are more likely to have favorable perceptions, and dropped measures are more likely to have unfavorable perceptions.
Eight forms of the predictions (P1 a , P2 0 , P2 a , P4 0 , P5 0 , P6 0 , P7 a and P8 0 ) had sufficient cell size to properly analyze using Chi-square analysis. These tests compare actual comment distributions to equal, "no effects" distributions. Significant p-values were found for seven of the eight. When measures were not diverse and complementary (P1 a ), not objective and accurate (P2 a ) or perceived benefits exceeded the perceived costs (P7 a ), measures were dropped from the DPM, as expected.
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Also as expected, measures perceived to be causally related (P8 0 ) were retained. Three tests of the predictions were significant in an unexpected direction. Contrary to expectations, measures that significantly communicated company strategy (P4 0 ), provided incentives for improvement (P5 0 ), or supported decision making (P6 0 ) were dropped from the DPM. This suggests complex tradeoffs of attributes in decisions to retain or drop measures.
Attribute Trade-offs
To explore whether the company trades-off some attributes for others, comments contrary to expectations for dropped measures were investigated further, as shown in The columns of table 7 labeled P1 a to P8 a present the number of times that favorable comments in the first column are associated with negative comments supporting alternative forms of each of the other predictions. For example , comments on the people -performance measures are helpful to distributors in making decisions (i.e., support for P6 0 ). However, the people measures were dropped from the DPM. The Atlas.ti query tool found several co-occurring comments supporting P2 a that the measures are not objective or accurate. This indicates that the DPM attribute of improved decision making is subordinate to the attribute of objectivity or accuracy. By far the greatest concentrations of negative comments reflect concerns for objectivity and accuracy (P2 a ) -29.1 percent of associated comments -and benefits versus costs (P7 a ) -30.9 percent of associated comments. The company consistently made choices that the attributes of strategic communication (P4), incentives for improvement (P5), and support of improved decisions (P6) were less important than the attributes of objectivity and accuracy (P2) and benefits versus costs (P7). Table 7 Interactions among Attributes of Unexpectedly
Dropped Measures
Discussion and Conclusions
This study focuses on the efforts of one large firm to model drivers of its distribution performance.
The present study complements recent research and offers an analytic generalization to an emerging 21 theory of performance measurement and management control. This study contributes to analytic generalization about performance measurement by empirically examining choices and revisions of diverse performance measures in a live setting. The results of this qualitative investigation support previous survey, experimental, and normative studies that collectively are refining a theory of performance measurement.
Drivers of Performance and Management Control
Theory of performance measurement and management control identify eight desirable attributes of performance measures. Measures should be: This trade-off of attributes can be seen clearly in the treatment of market share measures. As mentioned previously, the company initially emphasized the importance of the traditional market
share. This was due in part to corporate strategy and in part to the ability to measure market share in this market to the penny. Distributors complained that the traditional market did not capture the growth opportunities for many distributors. Unfortunately, in these new markets, market share is difficult to measure accurately. The dispute ultimately was resolved by eliminating all the market share measures from the DPM. The company decided to move the weight assigned to market share to sales growth measures. Measurement of sales growth is easily obtained, accurate and objective for both the traditional market and the new markets. Furthermore, diversity among measures was retained.
22
Apparently this company, with its long history of bottom-line financial management, could not tolerate subjectivity in measurement or high costs of improved information, nor could it tolerate the costly disputes that inevitably follow the use of subjective measures for performance evaluations and contracting. This finding has implications for the use of performance measures (e.g., some nonfinancial measures) that cannot be measured or audited as objectively or accurately as financial measures. For example, many organizations currently measure employee capabilities and some might use these measures in performance evaluations. A full understanding of the "softness" of such measures might preclude non-productive disputes that can arise if they are used to evaluate and reward performance, particularly in firms that are accustomed to using hard, financial measures.
The creative task facing PMM designers is to find measures that are: diverse and complementary, informative, strategic communication devices, incentives for improvement, supportive of improved decisions, causally related, but are also objective and accurate and not too costly. Without doubt, this is a challenging task.
Future Research
Future research might replicate this study in similar or dissimilar firms or to a large sample of diverse firms to obtain useful contrasts or further support for the theory of performance measurement models.
Future research questions include:
• What are the measurement tradeoffs among measure attributes that might be necessary to implement feasible PMM? Are cost of measurement and accuracy and objectivity always trump cards?
• Do all firms or only those with strong bottom-line, top-down management (or other attributes) stress cost of measurement, accuracy and objectivity of performance measures above all other attributes?
• Is complementarity an issue beyond initial design? Are there not tradeoffs but instead returns to scale and scope of measurement?
• What are the performance opportunity costs of trading off performance measure attributes?
Epilogue
As reported in Malina and Selto [2001] , three years after the introduction of the DPM distributors' measured financial performance improved significantly. The DPM is alive and well as of November 2003, and it is used for managing and evaluating distributors and distributorships. Top management commitment to using and refining the DPM was and continues to be strong. Distributors continue to adapt their behavior to the DPM's guidance, and the DPM has undergone several more changes since the completion of this research. An example of adaptation is that all distributors now meet the DPM's challenging safety goal, despite many early complaints that it was an impossible standard [see Malina   23 and Selto, 2001 ]. Changes to the DPM include dropping formal reporting of profit (PBIT/S), because of unforeseen claims by labor unions for a greater share of profits, and inclusion of several new measures that had been proposed earlier but not yet developed. The DPM continues to be the center point of the contract renewal process, and its increasing obje ctivity and relevance has added to its acceptance. The DPM has become an integral part of management control at this company and undoubtedly will continue to evolve. 2 Van de Ven and Drazin [1985] discuss the concept of equifinality as a serious impediment to progress in understanding firm behavior via contingency theory. We agree with the concept of contingency theory that management control systems and, hence, PMM are idiosyncratic but not random. We do fear that equifinality practically nullifies tests of contingency theory because each firm, at a particular time, is its own standard.
3 Discussions of many current accounting and performance measurement issues can be traced back to
Ijiri's classic work. 4 The company has created PMM for other elements of its value chain, but gave access to only the distribution PMM. Other PMMs reportedly are being used successfully. 5 Company employees refer to the DPM as a "balanced scorecard," but the term has acquired a generic label that might obscure the unique characteristics of this PMM.
6 For a discussion of the conflict resulting from this initial mismatch, see Malina and Selto [2001] .
7 For a complete discussion of the sampling technique, see Malina and Selto [2001] .
8 These interviews also were used to explore communication effectiveness in Malina and Selto [2001] . The present study reflects an independent use and extension of these qualitative data.
9 Perhaps respondents would have made more comments specific to the hypothesized attributes if we had posed direct questions. However, we wanted to avoid responses that were artifacts of leading questions. We do not have the luxury of a parallel case study where we could have asked leading questions to compare with our results . 10 Two researchers independently coded the qualitative data. The average coding reliability between the two coders was 87%, which falls above the minimum norm of 80 percent coding reliability (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . Coding discrepancies were reconciled by consensus. The consensus coding supports the reported qualitative analyses. For a complete discussion of insuring coding reliability, see Malina and Selto, 2001 .
11 Miles and Huberman [1994] provide extensive explanations of alternative coding methods. Malina and Selto [2001] for a complete discussion of finding associations among codes using qualitative software.
